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Financially successful retirement depends in large part on managing longevity risk: individuals 
need to save during their working lives to cover expenses in retirement, and then they must spend 
down those savings carefully so as not to outlive their assets. Despite the centrality of individuals’ 
expectations regarding life expectancy, little is known about how longevity expectations are 
formed and how they evolve as individuals age. This paper assesses the evolution of subjective 
survival probabilities, defined as the probabilities that people believe they will live to at least 75 
or 85 years of age. I examine the correlates of these reported probabilities when initially measured, 
how they change over time, and in particular, how they change with major life course events like 
the death of a parent, in-law, spouse, or sibling. I also examine how the subjective probabilities 
change in response to health shocks such as a heart attack or diagnosis of diabetes.  
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Perceptions of Mortality: Individual Assessment of Longevity Risk 
 
A financially successful retirement depends in large part on managing longevity risk. 
Individuals need to save during their working lives to cover expenses in retirement and then spend 
down those savings over the remainder of their lives to finance their consumption. This is the 
behavior predicted by the standard life cycle model in economics. The longer an individual expects 
to live, the longer he or she must work and/or save to finance consumption in retirement. 
Underestimating one’s longevity could lead one to consume assets ‘too quickly,’ exhausting 
resources while still very much alive. In contrast, over-estimating life expectancy would lead to a 
loss of utility, as savings would be in some sense wasted by not being consumed.1  
The appeal of financial instruments such as life insurance and annuities also depends on 
peoples’ estimates of their longevity: annuities are more valuable to those with longer life 
expectancies, and life insurance less so, as are aspects of financial behavior such as estate planning 
and the rate of withdrawal of assets from savings vehicles such as 401(k)s. Despite the centrality 
of individuals’ expectations regarding life expectancy, we know little about how these expectations 
are formed initially or how they evolve as an individual ages. Though a relatively recent strand of 
the economics literature has begun to explore subjective probabilities, much of the focus to date 
has been on the statistical properties of these distributions, and there is a great deal more to learn.  
This paper examines the evolution and validity of subjective survival probabilities, 
specifically the probability an individual anticipates living to a target age. I examine the correlates 
of these reported probabilities when initially measured, how they change over time, and in 
particular, how they change with major life course events like the onset of a medical condition or 
the death of a close relative. Finally, I explore briefly their validity with respect to actual survival 
to that age.  
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As was true in past work, we confirm that subjective expectations of survival vary with 
known risk factors such as smoking status, sex, and health. I also find strong evidence that 
measures of individual expectations contain important information – information that goes beyond 
that gleaned from life tables, and thus has the potential to help researchers better understand 
individual financial decisions. Furthermore, individuals appear to incorporate new information 
regarding their health status as it becomes available; the diagnosis of a medical condition 
significantly affects one’s projection of survival probabilities.  
This paper is organized as follows. First I discuss some of the recent research most relevant 
to this study, particularly drawing on research that uses the survey data and subjective probability 
question employed here. Next I discuss the data in more detail, followed by a focus on the 
subjective probability measures themselves, particularly on their validity and evolution over time. 
A final section concludes and provides some discussion of how these expectations might be 
informative with regard to financial outcomes.  
 
Prior Research 
Subjective probabilities figure prominently in economic models of behavior, yet much 
research examining the validity and usefulness of subjective probabilities has focused on survival 
probabilities.2 These studies have shown that subjective survival probabilities are, on average, 
close to actual survival probabilities. Yet there is substantial variation among groups. For example, 
men seem to over-estimate their survival probabilities on average, while women underestimate 
them (Hurd and McGarry 1995, 2002). Similarly, subjective survival probabilities vary with 
known risk factors such as smoking status and schooling level, and they are also predictive of 
actual outcomes. For instance, Bassett and Lumsdaine (2001) examined subjective probability 
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reports for a number of outcomes and concluded that these subjective measures varied with 
observable characteristics in expected ways (e.g. married women reported lower probabilities of 
working at later ages than did single women). The survival probabilities examined here and 
elsewhere have been used to study decision-making in several contexts including Social Security 
claiming, saving behavior, and retirement (Hurd, et al. 2004; Bloom et al. 2006; Griffin, et al. 
2012). 
Despite these successes, there are reasons to question how useful these probabilities are in 
economic models. One of most notable issues is the propensity of individuals to provide ‘focal 
responses,’ particularly probabilities of zero, one, or 0.50, since the actual probabilities for the 
chance of surviving to a given age cannot truly take a value of zero or 100 percent. Therefore, such 
reports can be problematic when included in economic models. For instance, a reported value of 
50 percent could be the individual’s true belief, or instead it could be a value close to 50 percent 
but rounded to a focal number. Alternatively, 50 percent could indicate a substantial amount of 
uncertainty, or even an unwillingness to think about the issue. Bruine de Bruin et al. (2016) 
examined what they termed the ‘50 blip’ in probability questions, noting that individuals may use 
wording such as a 50-50 chance, or 50 percent probability, to indicate that they were uncertain 
about the outcome, rather than intending to imply a specific probability. Interestingly, Bruine de 
Bruin et al. suggested that people might respond 50 percent to avoid thinking about ‘negative and 
uncontrollable events’ (p.127). Clearly, asking respondents about their chances of survival 
prompts them to consider their own mortality risk, for many a negative (and unpleasant) outcome. 
Nevertheless, by contrast, Bissonnette et al. concluded that there was ‘little support for the idea 
that 50%-point answers are used to avoid answering questions’ (2017, p. e294).  
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Despite the obvious statistical issues regarding such misreporting, most evidence indicates 
that these self-assessment survival reports contain some useful information that cannot be obtained 
elsewhere, and ought not to be completely dismissed. An individual reporting a 100 percent chance 
of surviving to age 75 likely intends to convey that he feels healthy and very much expects to live 
to that age and beyond. While analysts would be more comfortable were he to report a probability 
of, say, 90 percent, his report is nonetheless likely to be useful in understanding retirement and 
savings decisions. Furthermore, as van Santen et al. (2011) noted, excluding respondents who give 
focal responses not only leads to a smaller sample but it is also likely to be biased. In particular, a 
researcher who excluded focal responses would likely omit proportionately more low-educated 
individuals.  
For the analyst who needs to incorporate probabilities with focal responses into models, 
Kleinjans and van Soest (2014) have proposed a method for adjusting these responses. Their 
method, and similar techniques, have been successfully employed elsewhere, particularly with 
respect to survival probabilities (Hurd, et al. 2004; Bloom et al. 2006; Bissonnette et al. 2016).  
 Another issue in the realm of reporting error relates to the magnitudes of the probability of 
related events. When comparing probabilities of two (or more) events, such as the probabilities of 
working to age 62 and age 65, or the probabilities of living to ages 75 and 85, a small fraction of 
respondents in the HRS report a larger probability for the latter event, i.e. a greater probability of 
living to age 85 than to age 75. This behavior clearly indicates a misunderstanding of probabilities, 
and such results are typically impossible to employ in economic models of behavior or, in the case 
of survival probabilities, used in deriving survival curves.  
The usefulness of the information contained in an individual’s subjective expectation report 
will also depend on how well self-reports compare with known population averages or actuarial 
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predictions. For the case of survival probabilities, this standard of comparison would be with 
survival probabilities obtained from life tables. It may be that the individual’s own report is more 
informative or contains information supplemental to life tables. Elder (2012) found that life table 
probabilities had far greater explanatory power in models of survival than did subjective 
expectations, in a subsample of respondents for whom mortality status was known. Nevertheless, 
his results also showed that the subjective expectations were positively and significantly linked to 
surviving to the target age, even when controlling for the life table probability. This result strongly 
suggests that there is important information contained in subjective survival measures. is often of 
primary interest Moreover, when analyzing behavior, what an individual believes with regard to 
various measures, regardless of actuarial probabilities.  
 
Data 
The data used in this analysis come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a panel 
survey of the population age 51 or older.3 This series of surveys collect extremely detailed 
information on respondents’ health, financial resources, family, and personal characteristics. It 
also asks those surveyed about the likelihood of various events, including the probability of 
surviving to a particular age, working to a given age, entering a nursing home, and leaving an 
inheritance. The survey has also been linked with administrative records, most notably the National 
Death Index, Social Security Administration data, and Medicare records, providing researchers the 
opportunity to merge data not typically associated with nationally representative surveys. The 
initial cohort of sample members was first interviewed in 1992 and consisted of those born between 
1931 and 1941 and their spouses or partners. Additional cohorts of both older and younger 
individuals were added in 1998 to create a sample that, when appropriately weighted, is 
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approximately nationally representative of the population over the age of 50. New cohorts have 
since been added every six years to fill in the lower end of the relevant age distribution. HRS 
respondents are interviewed biennially until their deaths (or until they attrite from the survey for 
other reasons),4 with the most recent available data collected in 2016.5  
The exceptionally long panel available for the original cohort, stretching from 1992-2016, 
means that respondents in the original HRS cohort who have not died or attrited from the survey 
were interviewed 13 times over 24 years. It is thus possible to observe these individuals throughout 
much of their remaining lives, providing a near-complete picture of the various shocks people 
faced as they aged. Of particular note is that, by 2016, the youngest members of this cohort had 
(or could have) attained age 75. This distinction is important, because the primary subjective 
survival probability question, delineated below, asks respondents to report their chances of living 
to age 75. I can thus assess the predictive power of individual reports of survival probabilities for 
nearly the entire sample. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to do just that.  
The question of interest (and its preface) in the initial HRS survey wave is: 
‘Next I would like to ask you about the chances that various events will happen in the 
future. Using any number from zero to ten, where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 10 
equals absolutely certain… What do you think are the chances that you will live to be 75 
or more?’ 
Later waves broadened the scale to range from zero to 100. For consistency, the responses in this 
first wave are multiplied by 10 in this analysis.6  
There are similar questions about living to age 85 (in waves 1-4) and about the probability 
of living approximately 10 more years. Here I limit my analysis to the age 75 question, because it 
7 
 
is the only one that is consistent across waves and that also allows me to observe the true outcome 
for the original respondents.  
I restrict my analysis to individuals in the initial HRS cohort; I exclude persons born after 
1941 and who were thus too young to provide measures of mortality up through age 75. I also 
exclude proxy respondents because they were not asked the subjective probability questions. This 
leaves me with an analysis sample of 8,529 individuals.7 Note that, over time, as individuals died 
or were lost to follow-up, the number of respondent interviews in each wave declines. In addition, 
because the primary variable in the analysis, the subjective probability of surviving to age 75, was 
not asked of respondents over the age of 65 for most of the survey (all waves other than the first), 
the number of responses regarding survival probabilities declines as respondents ‘aged out’ of the 
question. Importantly, however, those individuals continue to contribute information regarding 
their longevity throughout the 13 waves of data, regardless of age, and thus provide the important 
information regarding the accuracy of subjective expectations.  
Descriptive statistics for a number of economic and demographic characteristics in the 
HRS analysis sample are reported in Table 1. Here I show the means and standard errors for the 
entire sample in the first two columns, and then I repeat these statistics separately for those 
respondents who survived to age 75 and those who did not. The values for the variables listed on 
the left hand side of the table are measured as of the first observation. The average age of 
respondents was 56, slightly fewer than half of these respondents were male, and over three-
quarters were married at baseline. Respondents’ health was good at the outset: using the self-
assessed health measure, where respondents could report being in excellent, very good, good, fair, 
or poor health, only seven percent said they were in poor health. Sadly, rates of obesity and 
smoking were high: 23 percent reported values for their height and weight such that the respondent 
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was classified as obese,8 and 26 percent smoked (in 1992). Only 21 percent reported engaging in 
vigorous activity three or more times a week. Given the typical age difference between husbands 
and wives, and the shorter life expectancy for men, the probability that the respondent had a living 
mother was 41 percent compared to just 16 percent for a father.  
Table 1 here 
Unsurprisingly, there are large differences in the means of these variables between those 
who survived to age 75 and those who did not, all significantly different from zero except for the 
number of children and the probability of being of Hispanic ethnicity (both of which are similar 
across groups).9 Perhaps most interesting for the present study are the large differences across the 
two groups in subjective survival probabilities. The average reported probability of surviving to 
age 75 for those who did not survive is 56 percent, while the average for those who did survive 
was 67 percent. Similarly large differences are found for the probability of living to age 85—45 
versus 36 percent. The well-known differences in life expectancy by sex are apparent, with 57 
percent of decedents being male compared to just 43 percent of survivors.  
With respect to other measures, survivors were advantaged in every way. They had more 
schooling, were less likely to be nonwhite, and reported being in better health. Only four percent 
of survivors reported being in poor health, compared to 16 percent of decedents. Thus subjective 
health, like subjective survival probabilities, appears consistent, at least on average, with actual 
outcomes. Survivors were approximately half as likely to be smokers, less likely to be obese, and 
more likely to engage in vigorous activity than decedents. They also had more income and wealth.  
In what follows, I examine how the subjective assessments by individuals of their 
likelihood of surviving to age 75 relate to actual mortality, to known risk factors for mortality, and 





Cross sectional Properties. Table 2 provides statistics regarding the issue of focal responses, 
namely responses of zero, 50, or 100 percent. I report the distribution of focal responses in both 
the first wave and for all of the survey waves stacked together. The latter makes full use of the 
available data, but by construction those who live longer contribute more observations than shorter 
lived respondents. This can lead to potentially biased assessments of the properties of subjective 
probabilities, if the two groups have different likelihoods of reporting focal values in general, or 
of probabilities of zero, 50, or 100 percent in particular. Here and in Table 3, I therefore present 
statistics for both the single wave and for the aggregate sample.  
Tables 2 and 3 here 
As others have reported, Table 2 shows a substantial heaping of respondents at 50 percent 
and 100 percent (just over 20% of the sample reported each of these values), but there is much less 
mass at zero percent. Clearly, from a probability standpoint, values of zero and 100 are 
inappropriate: saying zero or 100 by one not trained in statistics could indicate that he felt certain 
of the outcome, be it low or high, and simply rounded to a convenient number. While some analysts 
have called into question the value of reported probabilities of 50 percent, as noted earlier, 
excluding those giving focal responses likely leads to biased results. Unsurprisingly, the bias is 
larger for less educated individuals less clear about probabilities, and where the tendency to report 
zero, 50, or 100 percent was greatest.  
There are also differences between decedents and survivors in the prevalence of focal 
responses, as one would expect, with more reported values of zero and fewer reports of 100 percent 
among those who did die before age 75, but a similar percentage reporting a probability of 50 
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percent. Interestingly, nearly 20 percent of those who died before age 75 reported a 100 percent 
chance of surviving to that age.  
The second panel illustrates similar patterns for the stacked sample including observations 
in all waves. This combined sample is weighted toward those who were the longest lived, and thus 
likely younger at the outset. Interestingly, the patterns are similar to those identified before, though 
differences between survivors and decedents are slightly more pronounced. Approximately one-
half of the observations were non-focal responses; there were a large number of observations at 
probabilities of 50 percent and 100 percent, and fewer at zero.  
Figure 1 shows the entire distribution of reports as a percentage of the sample for each of 
the 11 possible probabilities.10 The lighter bars are for the first wave and the darker bars for the 
stacked waves (which again, skew right). The spikes in the percentage reporting 50 and 100 percent 
are clearly visible. Nonetheless, one can also see the distribution of non-focal responses which 
span the full probability range. Of note, the average life table probability for this sample was 69.3, 
so the distribution, and the means in Table 1 compare well with this value. Additional differences 
are explored in more detail below.  
Figure 1 here 
Regression estimates. While Table 1 illustrated the strong correlation between numerous 
individual characteristics and actual survival, many of these factors are also correlated with 
subjective survival probabilities, suggesting that the individuals may be consciously or 
unconsciously incorporating known risk factors into the assessments of their own survival 
probabilities. Table 3 explores some of these correlations in a multivariate regression of the 
subjective survival probability on characteristics such as sex, health, smoking status, etc., all of 
which are likely to factor into actual survival probabilities and thus into respondents’ assessment 
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of their survival probabilities. Here I stack all observations for an individual and correct the 
standard errors for these multiple measures.11 Because these estimates are similar to those reported 
elsewhere (Hurd and McGarry 1995), I discuss them only briefly and use a parsimonious 
specification to convey the main points although here we have more observations.  
Table 3 here 
Consistent with known differences in life expectancies, men report a significantly lower 
survival probability, 3.3 percentage points lower, than do women. (The average difference in life 
table values is approximately twice that.) Probabilities rise with age, as they should given the 
shorter time until age 75 for older respondents, and they rise as well with schooling. All else 
constant, nonwhite respondents forecast a substantially greater chance of survival, and Hispanic 
respondents, less.12 
A key factor in assessing one’s probability of surviving is one’s health status. The HRS 
offers several ways to measure health: a first is self-reported health, on a scale of 1-5, ranging from 
excellent to poor. It also asked people to assess their current medical conditions, taking the form: 
‘Has a doctor ever told you that you had a heart attack, coronary heart disease, angina, 
congestive heart failure, or other heart problems?’ 
A similar question was asked about high blood pressure, stroke, diabetes, cancer, lung problems, 
and arthritis. Finally, I include measures of peoples’ health behaviors: physical activity, smoking 
status (current and former), and measures of obesity or being underweight.  
Unsurprisingly, these health measures are strong predictors of individuals’ survival 
probabilities. For the general measure of overall health, differences in outcomes between the 
various states of health are large. Moving from excellent to poor health results in a predicted 
decline of 32 percentage points in the probability of survival or approximately 50 percent.  
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Each of the medical conditions captured by the HRS has a negative effect on expectations, 
and all but stroke and arthritis have effects that are significantly different from zero, typically at 
the one percent level. Behaviors such as being physically active and smoking have the expected 
effects, and they are similarly highly significantly different from zero. There is a large negative 
relationship between smoking currently and subjective survival probabilities, with smokers 
reporting a lower probability by approximately four percentage points or six percent—this result 
holds, despite prior work finding that smokers under-estimate their risk, indicating that the true 
difference could be even greater (Khwaja, et al. 2007; Bissonnette et al. 2017). 
Finally, in examining the relationship between survival probabilities and the mortality 
experience of family members, there is a positive and significant relationship between the age at 
death of a parent and the respondent’s own expectations. 
Comparison of Subjective Expectations. As noted above, the time span of the data allows me to 
follow the original HRS respondents (approximately age 51-61 in 1992) for 24 years, until the 
youngest reached age 75. With these data, I can compare the subjective survival probabilities 
reported at younger ages with actual outcomes. Similarly, I can compare the predictive power of 
subjective assessments with objective assessments from life tables which depend here only on age 
and sex.  
The first column of Table 4 shows that life table estimates are a more accurate assessment, 
on average of survival than subjective reports, with a mean self-reported probability of surviving 
to age 75 of 69.4, compared to the actual survival probability of 70.9. The average of the subjective 
reports was just 64.1, indicating that, on average, respondents underestimated their survival 
probabilities. This underestimate could be a potential liability with respect to adequate savings for 
retirement and financial well-being later in life. Much of the difference between the subjective 
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assessments and actual outcomes or life table values stems from the substantial under-reporting by 
women, a result that is consistent with the poor financial outcomes for women at older ages relative 
to men. (In 2018, 11.1 percent of women age 65+ were poor, compared to 8.1 percent of men in 
the same age range; Census, nd.)13  
Table 4 here 
Figure 2 further examines the validity of these reported survival probabilities. Here I assign 
respondents into a subjective probability bin based on their first reported probability of living to 
age 75, and then I calculate the actual survival probability to age 75 for individuals in that bin. 
There is a positive, nearly monotonic, relationship between reported survival probabilities and 
actual survival. The non-monotonicity at the endpoints, zero and 100, points to measurement error 
for these responses. Those reporting zero have a very low subjective probability, similar to those 
reporting 10 percent, suggesting that these respondents may have simply been ‘rounding down’ to 
zero. At the other end of the distribution, those reporting living to age 75 with certainty, did have 
a high survival probability but less than that for those reporting a 90 or even an 80 percent chance, 
again suggesting strong rounding. 
Figure 2 here 
Thus I conclude that the subjective survival measures are not perfect, yet they do seem to 
correlate well with actual mortality experience and with known correlates of mortality risk.  
Updating of Survival Probabilities. Of particular interest is how people update or change their 
expectations over time in response to new information.14 Table 5 illustrates the change in 
subjective survival probabilities associated with a change in self-reported health status. It extends 
Hurd and McGarry (2002) with many more waves of data than the two waves used in that study. 
Relying on the additional years of information available here, I follow respondents to older ages 
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and thus observe more transitions into fair or poor health status than in earlier work. It is in these 
worsening health categories that one might expect survival probabilities to be most impacted, as 
opposed to movements from excellent to very good health that would be expected earlier in the 
life course.  
Table 5 here 
The rows of Table 5 correspond to the five health status categories in a given wave (wave 
t)—excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor—and the columns denote health status in the 
subsequent wave (t+1). The top panel of the table illustrates the number of individuals in each cell, 
corresponding to the reporting of a particular transition between two health states. The bottom 
panel shows the average change in the reported values for the subjective probability of surviving 
to age 75 between the two waves. For instance, 66 respondents reported excellent health in one 
wave and fair health in the next. Among this group, the average decline in the probability of 
surviving to age 75 was 14.43 percentage points (or 22 percent based on the sample-wide average 
of 65). 
As is apparent, respondents revised down their subjective survival probabilities as their 
perception of their health status declined. There is only one cell in the table which did not exhibit 
this pattern—the transition from excellent to good health—and the change in average survival 
probabilities for those in that cell was relatively small—just a 1.11 percentage point increase in 
survival probability. Interestingly, all diagonal values of the table (i.e. the changes in subjective 
probabilities for those who report being in the same broad health category in each of the two 
waves) were negative. For example, for the 3,933 respondents who reported being in good health 
in both waves, the average change in subjective probability of survival was -0.53. This pattern 
indicates a slight decline in expected survival with age, despite no change in their subjective health 
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reports in terms of the 5-point excellent to poor scale. This result suggests that the 100-point scale 
used in the probability question offers a more finely-defined gradient for measuring health than 
general measures of overall health.  
A more formal measure of health asked about the onset of medical conditions diagnosed 
by a doctor. To the extent that the onset of various medical conditions such as a heart attack or 
cancer was unexpected, their onset would likely be associated with a reduction in the subjective 
survival probability. These questions regarding new medical conditions parallel those asked 
initially: 
‘Since WAVE X MONTH/YEAR, has your doctor told you that you had a heart attack, 
coronary heart disease, angina, congestive heart failure, or other heart problems?’  
Again the questions covered high blood pressure, stroke, diabetes, cancer, lung problems, and 
arthritis, in addition to the heart problems in the question above. 
This measure is imperfect, in that while a heart attack or stroke is unlikely to be missed, 
the incidence of high blood pressure will depend on whether an individual had seen a doctor. 
In employing the onset of disease as a measure of the change in health, we could also miss a 
more gradual degradation of health not attributable to one of these factors. With these caveats 
in mind, Table 6 examines the change in probabilities for those reporting the onset of a new 
medical condition. I divide the sample into those who had an onset of the particular condition 
(‘Developed condition’) and those who did not (‘No condition’), and I note the average 
subjective probabilities both ‘Before’ and ‘After’ for each group, as well as the change 
between the two waves.  
Table 6 here 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the largest changes in the subjective survival probabilities were 
among those who had a cancer diagnosis, followed by stroke, then heart disease, and finally lung 
problems. Conditions such as high blood pressure, diabetes, and arthritis had only small effects on 
expected survival chances. This result is consistent with the medical literature, and it suggests that 
people do update their probabilities with the arrival of new information. Furthermore, these 
changes across time for those determined to have a health condition were larger than changes for 
those not so diagnosed, for all but high blood pressure and arthritis. Nearly all of the differences 
are significant at a one percent level.  
Some of the changes associated with a given condition could be seen as relatively small 
relative to the expected increase in mortality risk, note that the ‘Before’ expectations ought to 
include all information known to the respondent at the time of the survey. Someone having higher 
risk of a heart attack, perhaps based on family history, smoking status, or obesity, might have 
already incorporated much of the risk into his expectation. In such a case, the onset/event itself 
would unlikely to convey entirely new information. Given our data, we cannot assess how much 
new information the event conveys.  
In addition to medical and health information, new information about a respondent’s own 
mortality risk could arise from the death of a close family member. This could include data about 
a genetic risk via the death of a blood relative, or simply about mortality risk in general, say from 
the death of a spouse or in-law. The lower portion of Table 6 assesses the potential impact of the 
death of different relatives on reported survival probabilities. Despite the intuition, there is little 
evidence that respondents update their expectations in light of the death of a parent, sibling, spouse, 
or in-law. In results not reported here in detail, these conclusions are unchanged if I allow for 
separate effects for men and women—testing to see if perhaps the death of a same-sex parent 
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resonates more than the death of an opposite-sex parent. The lack of a response could stem from 
the age of the respondents. Because they were already in their 50s at the study’s baseline, their 
parents were likely already rather old; the mean age for mothers in the sample at the initial 
interview was 80, and for fathers, 82. New information stemming from a parent (or parent-in-law) 
death at these later ages might not provide much information about the respondent’s own 
probability of surviving to age 75. Thus, while the age at which a parent died was a significant 
predictor of the survival probability as show in Table 3, the actual death of a parent at these ages 
did not significantly alter the assessment. 
Finally, in Table 7, I examine the relationship between changes in self-reported health, 
changes in medical conditions, changes in the status of close relatives, and changes in survival 
probabilities in a single regression to assess their relative importance in a more formal manner. 
The measure of the change in self-assessed health used here is drawn directly from a question that 
asked respondents to report how their health changed from the previous wave, rather than by 
comparing two independent reports of current health across waves. Specifically, the question 
reads: 
‘Compared with your health (2 years ago / [in the prior wave]), would you say that your 
health is much better now, somewhat better now, about the same, somewhat worse, or 
much worse than it was then?’ 
A total of 10.5 percent of respondents reported that their health was much better or somewhat 
better, two-thirds said their health was about the same, and 23 percent reported somewhat or much 
worse health. 
Table 7 here 
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As seen in Table 5, changes in self-assessed health are strongly correlated with changes in 
survival probabilities. The coefficients for all four categories are significantly different from zero 
and relatively large. Someone who reported his health as ‘much better’ than in the prior wave had 
an expected increase in his probability of surviving of 2.07 percentage points. With a mean change 
between waves of close to zero, this is a large amount. The largest change in the table was for 
those whose health became ‘much worse.’ 
For the onset of conditions, the relationships are all negative with the exception of the 
diagnosis of diabetes, although few coefficients are significantly different from zero. The strongest 
effect is for the diagnosis of cancer, which results in a decline of five percentage points. The 
coefficient for heart problems is also significantly different from zero and larger in magnitude than 
all but the ‘much worse’ health change. The advent of a stroke has a large effect in terms of 
magnitude but was not significantly different from zero because of the large standard error.  
Once again, we confirm that the death of family members has no statistically significant 
effect on respondents’ subjective survival probabilities.  
The Validity of Survival Probabilities. Tables 6 and 7 provide clear evidence that individuals 
adjust their expectations with the arrival of new information (recognizing that what is ‘new’ 
information to the researcher may not be entirely new to the respondent). Next, I ask whether and 
to what extent these updates in survival probabilities improve the predictive validity of the 
subjective expectations questions. In so doing, I compare subjective probabilities with life table 
values and then with eventual survivorship status at age 75. To see more clearly how the subjective 
probabilities evolve over time, I limit my sample to those who survived and remained in the survey 




Table 8 shows the average of the self-reported survival probability in each survey wave 
(SSP), the average life table values (LT), and the average of the ratio of the two probabilities 
(Ratio). The first triplet of columns (All) pertains to the full sample. The next two sets of columns 
pertain to survivors and decedents, respectively. There are several patterns contained in these data 
that are worth noting. First, the subjective survival probabilities are relatively constant across 
years. For the full sample, the average in the first wave was 68, while in the sixth wave (equivalent 
to 10 years of time), the average was 67.5—a minor change. Values for intervening years are 
similar. Second, the life table probabilities show a monotonic increase as probability theory 
implies. The conditional probability of surviving to age 75, having survived an additional year, is 
greater than the original probability. With these two trends, the ratio of the subjective to life table 
probability values steadily declines. 
Table 8 here 
When comparing the figures across the survivors and decedents, we see that the subjective 
probabilities for survivors are uniformly higher than those for decedents. In fact, these differences 
are surprisingly large, given that the decedents in this sample, by construction, must survive for at 
least six waves or 10 years beyond the first report. They are thus the longest lived/healthiest of the 
decedents, with ages in wave six ranging from approximately 61-71 years old. The differences in 
life table reports are far smaller than those for self-reports, because they rely solely on age and sex, 
factors that do not differ sizably for the two groups. There is no measure of underlying health or 
other individual-specific measures used in constructing the life table values. For both survivors 
and decedents, the life table values rise monotonically, and thus the ratios for self-reported to life 
table probabilities decline. For survivors, these ratios remain close to one, indicating relatively 
accurate reporting in terms of actuarial values, although one might expect a value greater than one 
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because these individuals do survive. In contrast, the self-reports for decedents are (accurately) 
well below the actuarial predictions. This result for decedents indicates that individual reports 
contain additional information missed in population averages: they predict a lower survival 
probability, on average, than actuarial tables, and they are correct in the sense that, ex-post, they 
did not survive. 
To compare more directly both the subjective reports and the life table values with 
observed outcomes, Table 9 presents the correlations between each of these probabilities and 
actual survival to age 75. Again the comparisons are carried out by wave. The correlations for both 
sets of probabilities are all positive and significantly different from zero, but they are substantially 
higher for the subjective probabilities than for the life table values. In Table 6 we saw that the self-
reported probabilities for women were closer to life table values than those for men, and thus in 
this table, the correlations between subjective probabilities for men and actual survival are also 
greater than those for women. Also, note that as the respondent ages and gets closer to the target 
age of 75, there is less uncertainty regarding survival and the correlations increase. 
Table 9 here 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The advent of ‘big data’ has proved to be a boon to researchers in a variety of fields. Yet 
as important as these data are to scientific research, survey information is needed to address many 
of the most important questions. The data discussed and analyzed in this paper, namely information 
on subjective probabilities, provide a prime example of the value of collecting information directly 
from individuals.  
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In many ways, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) has managed to take the best from 
both worlds, with links to administrative data sets such as Medicare and Social Security 
Administrative data. The HRS allows researchers to access enormous amounts of high quality 
information on respondent behavior. In addition, however, the survey data collected from 
individual interviews allow for insight into the motivation behind observed behavior.  
Here my focus has been on a relatively different and important type of question, namely 
peoples’ subjective probability of living to age 75. Despite evidence of measurement error, the 
subjective probabilities do reveal information beyond that gleaned from life tables, 
notwithstanding the prevalence of rounding to focal responses. Furthermore, as new information 
arises, particularly that related to the respondent’s health, the respondent updates those 
probabilities and these updates too contain useful information beyond the life tables. As work 
continues in this area, we can anticipate refinements in questioning and in statistical methods that 
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1 Some life cycle models allow for a bequest motive in which individuals receive utility from 
leaving bequests to their heirs (c.f., Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes 2002).  
2 Other studies have analyzed expectations regarding stock market returns (Dominitz and Manski 
2011; Lumsdaine and Potter van Loom 2017), returns to schooling (Dominitz and Manski 1996), 
and income (Dominitz and Manski 1997),  
3 Specifically, I use data from the RAND version of the HRS. 
4 Although the original samples are drawn from the non-institutionalized population, respondents 
are followed into nursing homes. Individuals who are unable to answer the survey are interviewed 
via proxy. Additionally, non-respondents are retained in the survey and attempts are made to re-
contact them in subsequent waves. Attrition from the survey has been exceptionally low; see HRS 
(2017) for detailed information on response rates.  
5 Data for the 2018 interview were not available at the time of this writing. 
6 Perozek (2008) noted that the change in scale did not seem to affect the likelihood of ‘rounded’ 
responses, and there is little evidence to suggest that this change would alter the conclusions of her 
study or other similar efforts.  
7 Because I use population weights in the analysis, also excluded from the sample are those with 
zero weight. 
8 This level likely contains substantial bias such that BMI is under-reported (e.g. Keith, et al. 2011).  
9 The number of observations for the full sample is larger than the sum of survivors and decedents, 
because the mortality status for some who left the survey is unknown. 
10 Recall that respondents were asked to report a value between zero and 10 inclusive. These 
reports were scaled to represent probabilities of zero to 100.  
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11 Despite having multiple observations per respondent, I do not estimate this regression as a fixed 
effects model because variables of primary interest such as schooling, race, and sex do not vary 
over time in the data and are thus not identified. Other variables such as smoking status also show 
little variation. The estimated effects for health-related variables are substantially unchanged in a 
fixed effects framework, and I explore the effect of changes in these variables below.  
12 Hispanics can be of any race.  
13 Perozek (2008) estimated survival probabilities using subjective reports from the HRS. She 
similarly found survival probabilities based on reports from women were lower than those from 
the life tables used by Social Security. In contrast the subjective survival probabilities for men 
were higher than life table values. Interestingly, the Social Security Administration later raised 
their estimate of male life expectancy and lowered the estimate female life expectancy. Her results 
thus suggest that the subjective responses in the HRS are valuable, and reflect more than a simple 
reading of actuarial values.  
14 Bissonnette et al. (2017) found in panel data that respondents seemed update their assessment 






Figure 1. Distribution of survival probabilities Wave 1 and All Waves 
























Figure 2. Percent surviving to age 75 by subjective probability 























Subjective Probability of Living to Age 75, Wave 1
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  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Demographic characteristics:        
  Prob live to age 75 64.42*** 0.318 56.45 0.691 67.29 0.389 
  Prob live to age 85 42.52*** 0.347 44.88 0.440 35.97 0.701 
  Age 56.26*** 0.031 56.15 0.062 56.47 0.040 
  Male 0.47*** 0.005 0.57 0.100 0.43 0.007 
  Married 0/1 0.77*** 0.004 0.70 0.009 0.79 0.005 
  Years of schooling 12.35*** 0.031 11.73 0.064 12.59 0.039 
  Number of children 3.22 0.021 3.30 0.045 3.26 0.027 
  Nonwhite/Non-Hispanic 0/1 0.13*** 0.003 0.17 0.008 0.12 0.004 
  Hispanic 0/1 0.06 0.002 0.06 0.005 0.06 0.003 
Health status/conditions       
  Excellent health 0.24*** 0.004 0.12 0.007 0.27 0.006 
  Very good 0.30*** 0.005 0.21 0.008 0.33 0.006 
  Good 0.27** 0.005 0.29 0.009 0.26 0.006 
  Fair 0.13*** 0.003 0.21 0.008 0.10 0.004 
  Poor 0.07*** 0.003 0.16 0.007 0.04 0.003 
  Underweight 0.01*** 0.001 0.02 0.003 0.01 0.001 
  Obese 0.23*** 0.004 0.27 0.009 0.22 0.005 
  Ever smoked 0.38*** 0.005 0.79 0.008 0.59 0.006 
  Current smoke 0.26***  0.005 0.44 0.010 0.21 0.005 
  Active 3+ times/week 0.21*** 0.004 0.18 0.008 0.22 0.006 
Family:        
 Mother alive 0.41*** 0.005 0.37 0.010 0.42 0.007 
  Father alive 0.16** 0.004 0.13 0.007 0.16 0.005 
  Number of siblings 2.85** 0.025 2.73 0.050 2.88 0.032 
Household financial characteristics:       
  Working 0.68*** 0.005 0.58 0.010 0.71 0.006 
  Household income 85,161*** 972 66,682 1,630 91,000 1,282 
  Household total wealth 257,146***  5,647 153,032 7,285 292,143 7,720 
       
Values are measured at the first interview. Dollar values are in 2018 dollars. Stars indicate if the 
difference between the survivors and decedents is significant at the ***1 or **5 percent levels. The two 
rightmost columns do not sum to the total, because a third category, those who attrit from the survey 
prior to age 75 and for whom the mortality outcome is unknown, are excluded from the breakdown by 
outcome.  





Table 2: Probability of focal response  
 Percent of sample 
Type of response All Decedents Survivors 
    
First wave (n=8,202)    
  Non-focal response 50.5 47.5 50.8 
  Subjective probability = 0  6.5 12.0 4.8 
  Subjective probability = 50 21.7 22.4 22.7 
  Subjective probability=100 21.3 18.1 21.8 
  Total 100 100 100 
    
All waves (n=35,463)     
  Non-focal response 49.1 44.3 51.0 
  Subjective probability = 0  5.24 11.2 3.6 
  Subjective probability = 50 25.17 27.0 24.3 
  Subjective probability=100 20.38 17.5 21.2 
  Total  100 100 100 
    












   
Personal Characteristics:  
 Male -3.30*** (0.50) 
 Age 0.44*** (0.06) 
 Schooling 0.50*** (0.13) 
 Nonwhite 5.30*** (0.71) 
 Hispanic -3.57** (1.04) 
 Married 0.95 (2.05) 
   
Health:    
 Excellent 11.59*** (0.03) 
 Very good 5.42*** (0.53) 
 Good (omitted) -- -- 
 Fair  -8.66*** (0.76) 
 Poor  -20.56*** (1.20) 
   
Existing Medical Condition:   
 High blood pressure -1.07** (0.48) 
 Stroke -1.33 (1.22) 
 Diabetes -1.60** (0.78) 
 Cancer -2.90*** (0.84) 
 Lung problems -3.92*** (1.05) 
 Heart problems -4.09*** (0.72) 
 Arthritis  -0.24 (0.45) 
   
Behaviors:   
 Physically active 0.83*** (0.18) 
 Smokes now -4.07*** (0.62) 
 Smoked ever 1.05** (0.52) 
   
Family:    
 Mom alive 9.53 (5.54) 
 Mom’s age 0.02 (0.07) 
 Mom’s age at death 0.11*** (0.02) 
 Dad alive 8.80 (8.26) 
 Dad’s age 0.02 (0.09) 
 Dad’s age at death 0.11*** (0.02) 
   
Mean of dependent variable 65.12 
Number of observations 31,711 
Number of respondents 7,834 
Stars indicate if the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at the 
***1 or **5 percent levels. 
Source: Author’s calculations from the Health and Retirement Study. 
 
 
Table 4: Survival probabilities    
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 All Women Men 
Wave 1    
 Actual survival probability 70.9 76.2 64.7 
 Subjective survival probability 64.1 65.8 62.0 
 Life table value 69.4 75.8 61.9 
 Ratio subjective/life table 0.93 0.87 1.00 
 Number 7000 3820 3180 
    
Sample is limited to those who report a value for the subjective survival probability and for 
whom actual survivor status is known.  





Table 5: Changes in subjective health and survival 
 Wave T+1 
Wave T Excellent Very good Good Fair Poor 
 Numbers Transitioning  
Excellent 2654 1169 346 66 19 
Very good 1623 4402 1815 260 37 
Good 541 2099 3933 1048 137 
Fair 114 381 1234 1907 544 
Poor  26 66 213 5391 897 
  
 Change in Survival Probabilities 
Excellent -0.36 -3.01 1.11 -14.43 -3.77 
Very good 0.99 -0.43 -1.22 -5.27 -3.34 
Good 0.50 2.22 -0.53 -2.56 -6.33 
Fair 6.99 6.97 1.61 -0.03 -4.95 
Poor 17.58 11.34 15.41 5.50 -0.56 
      






Table 6: Onset of medical conditions and family mortality 
  Subjective survival probabilities  
 Developed condition No condition 
Event Before After Change Before After Change 
Health conditions:       
 High blood pressure 65.41 64.14 -1.27 65.68 65.73     0.05 
 Stroke 54.80 50.88 -3.93 65.76 65.78  0.03** 
 Diabetes 60.47 59.78 -0.70 65.77 65.78   0.02*** 
 Cancer 63.89 56.47 -7.43 65.72 65.84   0.12*** 
 Lung problems 56.15 53.00 -3.14 65.78 65.81  0.04** 
 Heart problems 61.30 57.97 -3.33 65.77 65.86   0.08*** 
 Arthritis  65.41 64.53 -0.88 65.78 65.73    -0.17 
 Any condition 63.14 61.10 -2.04 66.14 66.53   0.39*** 
       
Deaths in the family       
 Parent died 68.35 68.81 0.46 65.43 65.39 -0.04 
 Mother died 68.05 68.49 0.44 65.49 65.47 -0.01 
 Father died 69.43 69.64 0.21 65.60 65.58 -0.02 
 Sibling died 63.66 64.95 1.28 65.94 65.87 -0.07 
       
 Spouse died  61.61 62.53 0.91 65.73 65.73 -0.01 
       
 Parent-in-law died 66.85 66.37 -0.48 65.59 6.60 0.01 
 Mother-in-law died 66.28 66.71 0.43 65.60 65.57 -0.04 
 Father-in-law died 67.50 65.42 -2.08 65.63 65.42  0.03 
 Sibling-in-law died  64.49 63.86 -0.63 65.87 65.90 0.02 
       
Stars indicate if the changes in the subjective survival probabilities for those who experience the 
onset of a condition and those who do not are significantly different at the *** 1 percent or **5 
percent levels.  









Table 7: Regression of change in subjective probability 
Variable Coeff (std err) 
Health:   
 Much better 2.07** (0.87) 
 Somewhat better 1.49** (0.65) 
 Same (omitted) -- -- 
 Somewhat worse -1.98*** (0.50) 
 Much worse -8.78*** (1.25) 
   
Onset of condition:   
 High blood pressure -0.66 (0.96) 
 Stroke -3.01 (2.46) 
 Diabetes 0.66 (1.41) 
 Cancer   -5.01*** (1.48) 
 Lung problems -1.53 (1.96) 
 Heart problems -2.18 (1.27) 
 Arthritis  -1.08 (0.87) 
   
Family:    
Mom died btw waves 0.57 (0.78) 
Mom’s age at death 0.005 (0.003) 
Dad died btw waves 0.82 (1.03) 
Dad’s age at death -0.006 (0.005) 
   
Mean of dependent var -0.056 
Number of observations 24,294 
Number of respondents 7,341 
Stars indicate if the coefficient estimates are significantly 
different from zero at the ***1 or **5 percent levels. 












 SSP LT Ratio SSP LT Ratio SSP LT Ratio 
          
Wave 1 68.0 68.4 1.0 70.0 68.8 1.02 59.8 66.9 0.90 
Wave 2 66.4 69.4 0.96 68.3 69.7 0.99 58.4 67.9 0.86 
Wave 3 67.9 70.9 0.96 70.1 71.2 0.99 58.9 69.5 0.85 
Wave 4 67.2 72.7 0.93 69.6 73.1 0.96 57.6 71.4 0.81 
Wave 5 68.0 74.8 0.91 70.5 75.1 0.94 57.7 73.6 0.79 
Wave 6  67.5 77.6 0.87 70.3 77.9 0.91 56.3 76.5 0.74 
          
Sample is those individuals for whom survivorship status at age 75 is known and who were interviewed 
through at least wave 6 with reported values for the probability of living to age 75 at each interview. 
The sample is thus balanced. SSP is the subjective survival probability, LT is the life table probability, 
and Ratio is the ratio of SSP to LT.  




Table 9: Correlation between subjective and life table probabilities and outcomes 
 All Women Men 
Wave Subjective Life table Subjective Life table Subjective Life table 
       
Wave 1 0.145 0.106 0.105 0.091 0.167 0.117 
Wave 2 0.147 0.108 0.108 0.085 0.176 0.127 
Wave 3 0.161 0.110 0.143 0.082 0.171 0.115 
Wave 4 0.174 0.114 0.173 0.094 0.165 0.117 
Wave 5 0.193 0.121 0.164 0.099 0.220 0.131 
Wave 6 0.207 0.124 0.189 0.085 0.220 0.127 
       
Source: Author’s calculations from the Health and Retirement Study. 
 
